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Technology assessment (TA) has attracted worldwide attention, but at present TA means different things to 
different countries. In industrialized market economy countries, TA consists of policy studies that deal with the 
side effects of technology. In centrally planned economy countries, TA is considered another tool for social 
management of technology. For developing countries, TA is expected to help in selecting appropriate 
technologies for development. These different perspectives have significant implications not only in how TA is 
done differently in different countries, but also in how international and global TA can be done effectively. 
Introduction 
Technology assessment (TA) has attracted worldwide interest. Discourses in TA 
have appeared in the literature of many countries and have taken place within several parts 
of the United Nations system. The professional society in this field, International Society 
for Technology Assessment (ISTA), has held conferences in a number of countries. Its 
Second International Congress on Technology Assessment was held at The University of 
Michigan, Ann Arbor (U.S.A.) in October, 1976, and was attended by participants from 
over fifteen countries [ 11. Subsequently, an international conference on “Technology 
Assessing: The Quest for Coherence” was sponsored by the East-West Center in Hon- 
olulu, Hawaii in May/June, 1977, attended by a number of experts from Asian developing 
countries as well as from industrialized market economy countries. Another international 
workshop on “Systems Assessment of New Technologies: International Perspectives” 
was later sponsored by the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) in 
Laxenburg, Austria in July 1977. The workshop was attended by a number of experts 
from Eastern Europe and from other industrialized countries. Having been involved in the 
discussions at all three international conferences, the author found that TA has different 
meanings, emphases, premises, and processes in different countries. This is not surpris- 
ing, as Rosenberg, among others, has stressed [2] that the same technology will have very 
different consequences in societies whose institutions, values, resource endowments, and 
previous histories vary. This paper is written on the basis of the three international TA 
conferences mentioned above and is an attempt to make a systematic comparison of the 
different thrusts, concerns, institutions, and practices of TA in different societies. It is 
hoped that this comparison will help international understanding and cooperation in the 
field of technology assessment. 
To facilitate comparison, the bulk of this paper consists of three sections devoted 
respectively to the industrialized market economies, centrally planned economies, and 
developing countries. Although generalization of TA patterns in each group of countries is 
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attempted, the existence of significant heterogeneity within each group will be acknowl- 
edged. The fourth and last section of this paper presents the author’s view on global TA, 
which potentially should involve transnational cooperation across the three groups of 
countries mentioned above. 
Industrialized Market Economies 
Industrialized countries with market economies, including all the OECD countries,’ 
have traditionally taken a comparatively laissez faire attitude toward both their economic 
and their technological activities. With these activities managed mainly in the private 
sector, their recent histories are adorned with the success of technologies that have been 
harnessed to serve a diversity of intended purposes mostly reflected in the marketplace. 
However, this very “success” of technological change has often brought about unin- 
tended consequences that are often undesirable from the standpoint of certain segments of 
the society, or the society as a whole. The pursuit of narrowly defined objectives resulting 
in undesirable side effects for the society at large has been aptly called “tyranny of small 
decisions” [3]. Much emphasis of technology assessment in market economies has been 
put on the avoidance of this tyranny through the systematic anticipation of the side effects 
of technology and the timely policy action to ward off the negative consequences. The 
emphasis on the unintended consequences of technology has led to several major thrusts of 
TA in industrialized market economies. First, TA is purported to be and is becoming an 
assessing activity that is broader than the traditional evaluative and planning activities 
(cost-benefit analysis, evaluation research, planning-programming-budgeting system, 
etc.) that are concerned only with the intended consequences. For example, the TA 
community has been repeatedly urged to study who would gain and who would lose, how, 
what, and how much (distributive cost-benefit analysis), if certain technologies were 
allowed to be deployed without modification. A correlated thrust of TA in industrialized 
market economies is toward public participation. Admittedly more a goal than an accom- 
plishment at present, public participation in TA has found increasing receptivity [5] in 
those industrialized economies where the traditional political process is openly adversa- 
rial. The publics whose interests and participation are considered include the parties that 
may be affected by the technology (or technology-related problems) and the adversary 
social groups. 
Since unintended consequences of technology often take a long time to manifest 
themselves-emission of air pollutants became a serious side effect of the automobile only 
after 50 years of its mass production-assessment of major technologies in industrialized 
market economies has been conducted with longer and longer time horizons. To cite a few 
American examples familiar to us, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) completed 
a mini-TA on the microcomputer [6] toward the year 2000; the Energy Research and 
Development Administration (ERDA) sponsored a TA on solar energy [7] with a time 
horizon of the year 2020, and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is supporting 
an integrated technology assessment of coal energy [8] until the year 2030. The long-term 
assessment of technological consequences is dufficult but considered necessary. Social 
’ These countries are memben of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. They are 
the North American countries of Canada and the United States, the Western European countries of Austria, 
Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, West Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxemburg, the Nether- 
lands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, and the United Kingdom, and the Pacific 
countries of Australia, New Zealand, and Japan. 
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values and structures may undergo drastic changes over decades, rendering extrapolation 
of quantitative trends on the basis of empirical data unreliable. Two fundamental im- 
provements over the past practice have been suggested for dealing with long-term TA. 
One is to include in substantive TA projects the historical perspectives that are pertinent to 
the social and technological developments to be projected. There is no assurance that the 
historian’s inputs are useful and incorporable to substantive TA that is addressed to the 
long-term future. However, pertinent historical perspectives can impart to serious 
technology assessors the necessary humility, sensitivity, and wisdom in thinking about the 
future [9]. There appears to be a serious lack of historical perspectives in most substantive 
TAs conducted, and the correction of this deficiency is a plausible future trend in TA 
practice [lo]. The second suggested improvement for dealing with long-term TA is to 
think about the future in a creative mode. Instead of extrapolating current social trends 
into the future or choosing a particular deterministic future as the social norm, a range of 
alternative futures will be created dialectically on the basis of plausible social values. The 
effects of technology and the corresponding policy responses in the long-term TA will be 
embedded in the set of alternative futures thus created. A specific example of TA in the 
creative futures mode can be found in the EPA project [8]. It should be noted that all the 
three long-term TA projects cited previously [6-81 have used the creative futures mode to 
various degrees. 
The emphasis of TA in industrialized market economies to avoid the tyranny of small 
decisions has presented a dilemma. Underlying vital market forces are basically “small 
decisions, ’ ’ which by definition do not take large social welfare into account. In such an 
environment, the image of TA is that of a constraint on the vitality of market forces. We 
may call TA a “prudent look before we jump,” but fundamentally TA is a look on behalf 
of society before entrepreneurs of technological changes in both private and public sectors 
are allowed to jump. Boulding estimated that in industrialized market economies, 80% of 
operational assessments are in the market place, the rest being in the government process 
[ 111. In spite of some pro-TA attitudes expressed by industry [ 121, there is a general 
concern that TA as has been practiced in industrialized market economies may stifle 
technological creativity and deployment. Boulding has sounded the caution that, by stress- 
ing the sin of commission, we may neglect the sin of omission [13]. He is afraid that if the 
sanctions against evil are too severe, they may be applied against honest mistakes to 
the point where nobody will be willing to do anything or take any risks. The other side of 
this cautionary coin is that, unless TA becomes espoused by the industrial and technologi- 
cal establishments-the prime movers of technological change-TA may be unable to 
really affect technology, or even be unable to survive in the long run, in industrialized 
market economies. 
One can argue that the basic issue behind TA in industrialized market economies is 
whether TA can stimulate creativity as well as judgment with respect to technology. As 
long as TA is used only to judge technology, its function would be mainly regulatory, and 
its users would be chiefly regulatory agencies in the government. To that extent, TA could 
be considered antitechnology by the technology developers. However, if TA is also used 
innovatively to modify existing technology and to create new technology desired by 
society at large, its function would also be developmental, and its users would include 
“protechnology” developers in both public and private sectors [ 141. 
Another way to look at this basic issue is to consider the conceptual model for TA 
[15] in Fig. 1. The central idea embodied in the diagram is that new technologies are 
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viability, political feasibility, and social acceptability, and shown in the upper portion of 
Fig. 1. Technology developers in both public and private sectors have been playing the 
role of entrepreneurs to assure that technologies are created or modified to pass all the tests 
of primary considerations. The lower portion of Fig. 1. represents the various side effects, 
both beneficial and detrimental, that would be identified by TA as secondary considera- 
tions of technological impact from the societal standpoint. The question is whether there is 
sufficient coupling and incentive to entrepreneurs who will create or modify technologies 
that will pass all the tests of secondary as well as primary considerations. Some people in 
industry have indeed espoused evolving social concerns as new opportunities for 
technological development. An often-cited example is Honda’s double-combustion 
CVCC (compounded vortex controlled combustion) engine, which was developed in 
response to the social (global as well as Japanese) need for low-pollution automobiles [ 161 
and which contributed significantly to Honda’s share of the world’s automobile market. In 
the same vein, Gerardin of France has urged multinational companies to take an active and 
creative attitude to assume the social consequences of new technologies instead of re- 
sponding passively in compliance with government-imposed regulations [ 171. 
Institutionally, by far the largest sponsorship of TA projects conducted in the indus- 
trialized market economies has come from the executive branch of national governments. 
The most visible TA institution in the legislative branch has been the U.S. Congressional 
Office of Technology Assessment (OTA), with bicameral and bipartisan support and 
control. Other countries have been less successful in institutionalizing TA in the legisla- 
tive branch. For example, a bill introduced in 1973 to establish an “Office for the 
Evaluation of Technological Development” in the West German Bundestag [ 181 was 
defeated in 1975, and a similar bill introduced to the French Parliament in July 1976 has 
not precipitated any speedy action [19]. A major roadblock can be traced to the Western 
European ’ ‘monistic ” system, in which, unlike the U.S. system, there are close links 
between the executive and the parliamentary majority. Thus the demands by the opposi- 
tion to receive information (nontechnical as well as technical) that it is traditionally 
denied, and to an equal number of seats in the political steering body of the proposed 
parliamentary TA institutions, are naturally resisted by the majority. It has also been 
observed that, because of the highly political environment in the U.S. Congress, many 
OTA projects have supplied technological information for short-term legislative delivera- 
tions, in contrast with tbe long-term holistic TA studies sponsored by agencies in the 
executive branch. 
In Japan the traditionally close relationship between industry and government has set 
the operational pattern of TA activities in that country. A list of TA projects compiled by 
the Japanese Science and Technology Agency2 indicates that over half of the TA projects 
in Japan have been conducted by industry. At the request of the Ministry of International 
Trade and Industry (MITI), the Japanese Industrial Technology Council set up a Technol- 
ogy Assessment Panel, which recommended in 1975 that TA should be done by the 
entities engaged in development of the technology and its application, usually the private 
sector industries, and that the government should both conduct TAs and “enforce mea- 
sures to encourage the execution of technology assessments by private enterprise” 1201. 
One of these measures has been described by Hoashi of the Japanese National Institute for 
Research Advancement as a form of coercion: “the government affiliated organizations 
z The list, obtained by Kan Chen in August 1976, showed 27 TA projects sponsored by government and 48 
by industry. 
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which are being engaged in the R&D should make the results of TA public in principle 
before carrying out the experiments, and also the private corporations which are partly 
responsible for R&D projects of the government and have received government support or 
loan have to carry out TA” [21]. As a result of such policy of institutionalizing TA, the 
Science and Technology Agency reported in March 1977 that out of 521 representative 
corporations in a survey, an overwhelming majority (72%) had applied, or had scheduled 
to apply, TA in their research and development (R&D) planning. There is a widely held 
concern in Japan that TA as practiced in industrialized market economies may have 
overemphasized the negative impacts and hence might become an inhibitor to technologi- 
cal innovation. The stress on the involvement of the innovators in industry to conduct TA 
is the Japanese way of implementing the social dynamics of TA idealized in Fig. 1. 
The heterogeneity in defining and institutionalizing TA has made it difficult for 
industrialized market economy countries to cooperate in conducting transnational technol- 
ogy assessments. Blessed with the visible success of its 1972 international seminar on 
technology assessment [23], OECD tried to enhance international cooperation among its 
member countries by initiating both methodological and substantive TA studies. The 
former proved easier as methodological guidelines [24] are more theoretical and politi- 
cally less sensitive than policy-oriented substantive TAs. Of the three substantive topics 
chosen by OECD for transnational cooperation in TA, namely, new urban transportation 
systems, humanized working conditions, and telecommunications technologies, only the 
first study has continued. Even that study (on transportation) has taken the form of 
“coordination” by pooling available national resources in a common effort. 
A review of the OECD difficulties in transnational cooperation of TA [25] revealed 
that the crucial problem is the often changing interpretation and defense of national 
interests, which must be served by any international cooperation. Real policy decisions 
have to be made between competing and conflicting interests and values. Intemationaliza- 
tion of other than direct technical and economic effects implies a deep change in social and 
legal structures, the kind of change no country is ready to make blithely. In addition to the 
lack of appropriate TA institution to represent each country (with the exception of the 
United States), as discussed previously, the industrialized market economies in OECD 
also face the impasse of sharing technological information (necessitated by transnational 
TA) in the ambience of international competition where secrecy during the phase of 
development is paramount. 
Centrally Planned Economies 
In centrally planned economies, including all the CMEA countries,3 activities in 
science and technology are largely determined by sociopolitical goals. Science and 
technology goals are subordinate to the higher-level ideological and national goals. Histor- 
ically the levels of economic affluence and technological advancement of the centrally 
planned economies have lagged behind those in some industrialized market economies 
[26]. Also, the management systems for economic and technological progress are gener- 
ally considered less experienced and less developed. For these historical reasons, man- 
agement effectiveness for the national economy ranks very high at present as a national 
goal for the Soviet Union and other CMEA countries [27]. 
3 These countries are members of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance. They include the Soviet 
Union, the East European countries of Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, 
Poland, and Romania, and the non-European countries of Cuba and Mongolia. 
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Science and technology have been considered by centrally planned economies as 
major instruments for economic development. Karl Marx repeatedly synonymized the 
growth in labor productivity with technological progress [28]. It has been estimated that 
75% of the increase in U.S.S.R. national production will be due to the use of the fruits of 
scientific research [29]. Thus the higher goal of national economic efficiency can be 
translated to the subsidiary goals of acceleration of technological development, intensifi- 
cation of production activities, and growth of labor productivity. Currently the overall 
U.S.S.R. national five-year plan contains a “Science and Technology Development 
Plan” as a component, which covers basic research and development of major science and 
technology, introduction of new technologies and innovations, automation of production 
processes, development of new products, and standardization and industrial engineering 
[301. 
Within the all-encompassing framework of central planning, it is easy to view 
technology assessment as another tool for social management of technology. As such, TA 
is defined as evaluation of the consequences of the development of technology, and is 
separated from technological forecasting (,TF) and policy options generation in response to 
the projected consequences. Thus TA is parallel to TF and several other management 
tools, and all of these are put under an umbrella called SANT [3 l] (systems assessment of 
new technologies), as shown in Fig. 2. 
Precisely how much of SANT is TA and how much TA in practice overlaps with the 
other management tools, are not as important as the major concerns shared by the centrally 
planned economies in their social management of technology. Dobrov pointed out three 
significant trends in technological change: (1) increasing rate of substitutions of technol- 
ogy generations (doubling every 20 years), (2) increasing time and cost of R&D parts of 
the technology life cycle (cost doubling and time lengthening about 50% in the last 5-7 
years), and (3) increasing time spent on systems analysis and decision making (toward 
one-third of the total technology life cycle). Thus, a major concern in the social manage- 
ment of technology is the long lead time between R&D and production. It is hoped that 
TA or SANT applied as a management tool can help the understanding of technological 
change as a dynamic system and provide the necessary management information to speed 
up technological development and technology diffusion in the national economy. 
Other major concerns in the centrally planned economies stem from their historical 
lag in economic and technological development behind the industrialized market 
economies. One of these concerns relates to possible detrimental effects resulting from the 
importation of advanced technologies from the industrialized West, and TA is considered 
as a possible tool for evaluating these side effects. Another concern relates to the tra- 
ditional laissez faire tendency in science and basic research. In view of the demanding 
national goals and the decreasing rate of expansion of scientific resources, however, this 
laissez faire attitude toward science can no longer be permitted [29]. To make science 
SANT = TF + TA + AT + ERD + STP 
SANT = Systems assessment of new technologies 
TF = Technology forecasting 
TA = Technology assessment 
AT = Alternative technologies (“evaluation of variants for technology policy”) 
ERD = Evaluation (of “usefulness”) of R&D 
STP = Science-and-technology potential indicators 
Fig. 2. Composition of SANT (from Ref. 131). 
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more manageable, TA is expected to apply the principles of the “Science of Science” 
[32], a new discipline whose objective is a systematic theoretical analysis of scientific and 
technological efforts. 
Given these concerns, TA as practiced in the centrally planned economies has very 
different thrusts than those of the industrialized market economies. First of all, TA, as the 
application of the science of science, attempts to anchor itself on theoretical principles of 
organization, objective measurement of performance, rational analysis for multilevel 
planning, and cybernetics of technological change. This theoretical, objective, rational 
orientation is exemplified by the use of “goal trees ” in the analysis of the hierarchy of 
planning goals and by the inclusion of the whole chain of elements: education-science- 
technology-production-consumption in the technological development process 1271. Spe- 
cific TA approaches are represented by newly approved methods [33] that stress the 
technical and economic dimensions. However, the economic effect calculations are quite 
comprehensive, including the entire lifetime of a given innovation with regard to the 
consumer and estimates of economic effect of new technologies with improved quality 
parameters. An even more comprehensive assessment approach that includes social as 
well as economic effects will be used by numerous Soviet research organizations from 
1977 on [34]. Interestingly, the social effects will include such intangibles as greater 
opportunities for the comprehensive spiritual development of the individual, the collec- 
tive, and the whole of socialist society, as well as conservation of the environment. Again, 
the rational and quantitative orientation in the TA approach is evident here, as represented 
by the current effort to use several groups of quantitative indices for the various effects, 
and the hope to reduce all the effects to a common integral index for setting project 
priorities. 
The theoretical and scientific thrust is evident even in policy related activities. 
Academician M. D. Millionshchikov, Vice President of the U.S.S.R. Academy of Sci- 
ences, expected the science of science to eventually lead to recommendations about the 
optimum means of development of science [35]. In discussing the purpose of science- 
policy studies, D. M. Gvishiani, Deputy Chairman of the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers 
State Committee for Science and Technology, stated that such studies are concerned with 
the general laws of development of science and technology and would become the theoret- 
ical basis in which the fundamentals of science policy are worked out [36]. 
Other interesting comparisons can be made between TA as practiced in centrally 
planned economies and TA as practiced in industrialized market ecnomies. Both groups 
of countries bave defined technology broadly for the purpose of TA. Recognizing the 
important interaction between technology and society, especially from the standpoint of 
social management of technology, Dobrov defines technology as a system consisting of a 
set of technical means (hardware), methods and procedures to use those means effectively 
(s&ware), and special organizations (orgware) designed to provide the utilization by the 
decision makers [31]. This definition of technology resonates with the three kinds of 
technologies (physical, social, and organizations1 technologies) that have been assessed in 
the United States [37]. 
The identification of potentially detrimental side effects of technology, so em- 
phasized by TA in industrialized market economies, is not very pronounced in TA prac- 
ticed by centrally planned economies. In fact, Dobrov makes a distinction between “man- 
agerial TA” and “alarm-oriented TA” and considers the former to be more important 
[38]. Surely the protection of environment is occasionally listed as a national goal, and the 
INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES ON TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT 221 
possible negative socioeconomic implications are sometimes listed as constraints placed 
on science and technology programs, but they are generally swarmed by the more direct 
and tangible goals of technical and economic developments. Also the distributive costs 
and benefits of new technology to various social groups within a country are never 
mentioned, let alone to be studied. 
Since TA in centrally planned economies is embedded in the social management 
system for those countries, it is not surprising that TA as practiced in those countries face 
a couple of dilemmas in central planning in general. One is the conflict between central 
governments’ authority and local individual initiatives. The other is the handling of 
disparate views on specific technologies, especially when such views are held by those 
perceived as political dissidents. These dilemmas are inherent contradictions accompany- 
ing socialist transformation and are among the most basic policy issues acknowledged and 
discussed by some centrally planned nations [39]. Of course, central planning is theoreti- 
cally a top down (i.e., hierarchical) approach, which has imperfect power in actual 
practice. A great deal of anticipation and feedback from bottom up keeps central planning 
practical, leading to successive changes, adaptations, and readjustments in various aspects 
of the actual decision-making system. These practical needs have led to the introduction of 
economic incentives in some centrally planned economies so that both managers and 
workers of the socialist enterprises are interested in the profitability of their economic 
performance [40]. In the Soviet Union, the planning for technological program is 
“polyhierarchical” in nature, since linear relationship does not always exist between 
organizations responsible for technological program (e.g., the U.S.S.R. Academy of 
Sciences) and the entire system of national economy management. Decisions at the highly 
centralized level, decisions at the lower planning levels, and decisions by mainly 
technological organizations are not always well correlated [41]. It is also important to 
consider the factors that will affect the implementation of plans after they are formulated 
and adopted. The effective implementation will depend critically on operative incentives 
as well as authorities. In the Soviet Union, creative work in science and technology is the 
province not only of full-time scientists, engineers, and specialists working in various 
State scientific organizations, but also of numerous qualified workers in industry, culture, 
and social management. Thus there are “voluntary research institutes,” which organize 
and direct the efforts of engineers, technicians, and workers to find new ways of solving 
current problems of technical progress in collaboration with professional scientists. Those 
engaged in the voluntary sector of Soviet science are motivated primarily by moral factors 
arising from a love for creative work in science and technology [421-which may or may 
not correlate well with immediate national economic goals at the central planning level. 
There are certainly environmentalists in centrally planned economies, and the en- 
vironmental dimension of TA has its place in multidimensional planning and assessment 
procedures. It is recognized that degradation of natural and human environment, rise of 
technocracy, and discrepancy between technological and social changes could adversely 
affect centrally planned economies as well. Although there are State Committees for 
Environmental Protection and Development in the Soviet republics, public debate through 
open adversarial processes is simply not done in centrally planned economies. 
Although “the State and its responsible organs, boards of management and indi- 
vidual managers do not want disparate and frequently contradictory assessments and 
recommendations from the isolated standpoint of economics, information science, psy- 
chology, etc. ” [29], disparate views do exist within the socialist systems such as between 
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labor and management. The differences are usually resolved through a process of social 
consultation, such as through Party leaders’ consultations (direct talks and meetings) with 
the working class of big industry [26]. 
Since TA is a part of the social management of technology in centrally planned 
economies, institutionally TA has permeated the organizational structure of science and 
technology management, such as the one for the Soviet Union (see Fig. 3), and the one for 
Poland shown in Fig. 4. It is interesting to note the close linkage between the legislative 
and the executive branches of Eastern European governments-similar to Western Europe 
but different from the United States. Unlike Western Europe, however, the legislative 
bodies in Eastern Europe are much more stable in terms of party control, It is also 
interesting to note the parallel status of the State Planning Committee and the State 
Committee on Science and Technology (above the U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences), both 
under the Council of Ministers (see Fig. 3). Thus, assessments of technologies of national 
significance tend to have their locus in and around these institutes. In the case of Poland, 
the existence of the Research and Prognostics Committee “Poland 2000” provides a 
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Fig. 4. Science and technology policy process in Poland [from Ref. 261. 
of Sciences. It appears that the Parliament could consider establishing an Office of 
Technology Assessment with a strong linkage to that committee. 
Transnationally, the CMEA has worked toward the cooperation and socioeconomic 
integration of its member countries. There are both centrifugal and centripetal forces 
affecting this integration [43]. In the area of science and technology, an interesting CMEA 
project of multinational technology forecasting and planning started in 1972 and resulted 
in 1976 a set of recommendations with respect to the employment of joint forecasting 
methods 14.41. The approach is so comprehensive that it contains at least some elements 
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that would usually be considered within the realm of TA. The ultimate goal of this joint 
forecasting exercise was to do cooperative planning. Thus four basic groups of criteria 
were used to guide the selection of a manageable number of technological possibilities: 
forecast reliability criteria, policy criteria, technical and economic criteria, and criteria of 
systematic coherence. The policy criteria take into account the social structure, the inter- 
nal and external policy of the individual country concerned and the CMEA as a whole, the 
ideology expressing the attitude of the state towards science, and the national goals 
(economic growth, defense, national prestige, etc.). Each participating country was asked 
to strategically recognize those technologies for which the country should not deliberately 
try to reach the state of the art but should be content with relying mainly on the application 
of international scientific and technical experience. 
The lessons learned from this CMEA project included the importance of involving 
decision makers of various levels as well as scientists and engineers, and the need for 
continuing improvement of methodology-lessons quite similar to those learned else- 
where from TA projects. Furthermore, similar to the OECD experience discussed in the 
last section, the CMEA project led to the conclusion that taking into account the specific 
interests and priorities of each member country is a main precondition for successes in 
multinational projects in this area. In summary, the benefits of integration must outweigh 
the costs of integration in the long run and the national bodies must be convinced that they 
can preserve their sovereignty while being helped by multinational cooperation and con- 
sultation [45]. 
Developing Countries 
The most persistent goal of the highest priority shared by the developing countries 
has been to close the economic gap between them and the industrialized world. In spite of 
a great deal of well-intentioned efforts from both rich and poor countries in the past three 
decades, this so-called north-south gap has been widening in terms of per capita gross 
national products. Turning from deference to defiance, the developing countries have 
demanded a new international economic order in which they will have at least equality of 
opportunity for future development and more proportional share of future growth. This 
demand has received global moral backing [46] and has received some serious support 
from the industrialized market economies and the centrally planned economies, as the 
industrialized countries themselves face unprecedented problems of energy and raw- 
materials shortage, economic “stagflation,” and balance-of-payment deficits. Had the 
developing countries (the “South”) not called for a new international economic order, the 
industrialized countries (the “North”) would have pressed for one [47]. 
Parallel to this background, there has been a sobering understanding of science and 
technology for development. Until recently it had been the general belief that modem 
science and-technology could lead to nothing but the improvement of the living standards 
of all people in the developing countries. The major concern was not whether all science 
and technology are beneficial to development, but whether the traditional values and 
institutions in the developing countries could undergo timely and sufficient changes to 
benefit from the fruit of science and technology. Now we have learned from experience 
that direct transfer of foreign agricultural and industrial processes can often aggravate 
unemployment in the developing countries, uprooting the rural unemployed as they mi- 
grate to urban ghettos. The benefits of science and technology have thus often been reaped 
by a small privileged minority without touching the masses living near the subsistence 
level. Large-scale irrigation projects such as the Aswan High Dam could lead to tremen- 
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dous environmental problems, threatening public health and future land use [48]. High- 
yield grain monocultures, the kernel of the green revolution, could be ecologically un- 
stable and can be maintained only by heavy use of fertilizers, pesticides, herbicides, and 
energy [49]. Consequently, the “green revolution” bas benefited only the rich farmers, 
leaving the poor farmers untouched and driving out the peasants who used to work for the 
rich farmers [SO]. Multinational corporations, which have served as main vehicles for 
technology transfer from industrialized market economies to developing countries, have 
also been a source of undesirable foreign political influence [51]. The fact that much of 
modem technology is often unavailable to the developing countries except as part of a 
package offered by transnational enterprises (publicly as well as privately owned enter- 
prises which deal with international flows of equipment, finance, technical know-how, 
and personnel) only reflects the technological overdependence of the developing countries 
on the industrialized world. As the developing countries have tried to develop their 
technical human resources, much of this effort has turned out to be irrelevant or unretain- 
able to the development needs, resulting either in a mismatch between the demand for 
skilled factory workers and the supply of theoretical scientists, or in technical “brain 
drain” from the developing countries to the industrialized world.4 For one reason or 
another, science and technology seem to have only helped the rich countries get richer and 
have not benefited the poorest in the poor countries. This perception has led to the demand 
of creating a “new scientific and technological order” within the new international 
economic order [52]. 
The significance of the new international scientific and technological order can be 
appreciated only from a historical perspective. In the 1950s a host of new nations emerged 
as numerous former colonies gained political independence. However, it was not very 
long before the new nations realized that political independence would not improve their 
human welfare enough without economic independence. The 1960s was the decade of 
technical assistance, mostly in the form of “turnkey projects” rendered by the industri- 
alized world (OECD and CMEA countries) to the developing countries. Pretty soon the 
developing countries learned the lesson that technological independence underlies eco- 
nomic independence, and that the former cannot be attained through package deals. The 
byword for the developing countries in the 1970s is “self-reliance,” which has been 
exemplified by the assiduous efforts of the Chinese people over two decades. After the oil 
embargo in 1973, many developing countries began to see two interrelated facets in the 
strife for a new scientific and technological order. The first facet is for those developing 
countries exporting raw materials to nationalize their natural resources and to bargain for 
the highest possible prices for their raw materials in the international market. The other 
facet is for all developing countries who must import agricultural and manufactured 
products to develop their own agriculture and industry, using technologies that fit their 
own development criteria. This latter facet implies the need for developing countries to do 
technology assessment. 
According to Chatel [53], developing countries would assess technologies according 
to the following typical criteria: 
1. Employment: with surplus of low-cost labor and often high unemployment (as 
high as 70% in some nations), it behooves most developing countries to consider 
4 The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) estimated that, in economic 
terms, the imputed capital value of the skill of technicians migrated to United States, Canada, and Britain from 
the developing world exceeded the aid from those three countries to the developing world by $4.6 billion for the 
period of 1960 to 1972. 
KAN CHEN 
labor-intensive processes, especially in such cases as road construction, instead of 
using Western capital-intensive labor-eliminating technologies. 
Capital: being capital limited, especially in foreign exchange, most developing 
countries should consider capital conserving, inexpensive technologies, as 
exemplified by mini-cement factories in India. 
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3. Energy: with energy cost at a premium and rising continuously in the foreseeable 
future, most developing countries should consider energy conserving technolo- 
gies where applicable. 
4. Material: indigenous materials should be used wherever possible, not only to save 
cost but also to support local economy and employment (a good example is the 
use of bamboo instead of steel pipes for transporting irrigation water). 
5. Environment: while the rich world is concerned about the impact of its pollutive 
activities on life-supporting systems, the poor world is more concerned with the 
pollution of poverty [52]-pests, epidemics, unsanitary conditions, and so on. 
6. Culture: consideration must be given to the taste, need, habit, and tradition of the 
local people. For example, women in traditional Arab societies have very dif- 
ferent work roles than Western women. Small electric grinders would be very 
useful to those women in African villages who currently spend about 3 hours each 
morning crushing cereal. 
7. System: marginal changes in the total sociotechnical system may be more effec- 
tive than revolutionary changes. Thus oxcarts may be good transportation substi- 
tutes for people carrying food on their heads. Incremental changes of local 
bureaucracy may accomplish higher efficiency than abrupt transplantation of 
Western administrative technology [54]. This is not to ignore the goal of eventual 
modernization of the entire technological and managerial system. 
Presumably, technologies meeting such criteria would be “appropriate technolo- 
gies,” a term that has been popularized by Schumacher’s seminal work [%I. Because 
of Schumacher’s emphasis on criteria (1) and (2) in the preceding list, appropriate tech- 
nologies have often been identified exclusively with “intermediate technologies” or 
“light capital technologies,” characterized by labor intensiveness and capital conserva- 
tion. This approach, in contrast with the direct transplantation of Western technology 
through turnkey projects discussed previously, has received increasing popular and of- 
ficial support. 
Ironically the support for appropriate technology appears to be concentrated at pre- 
sent in the industrialized world, as kvidenced by a number of new programs, research 
institutes, and even public laws stressing this concept.s Many developing countries have 
suspected appropriate technologies as second-best technologies that the industrialized 
countries are willing to share while keeping the most advanced technologies to them- 
selves. 
Actually appropriate technologies need not be exclusively intermediate technologies. 
The test of appropriateness, such as by the list of criteria given previously, sbould be 
based on national development goals and sectoral/local community needs. As developing 
countries are not a homogenous group, their goals and needs may be very different from 
each other. Since the oil embargo, differentiation has been made between the Third World 
5 Representative of the support are new programs in appropriate technology in U.S. AID, California State 
Government, U.S. and U.K. research institutes in appropriate technology, and U.S. Public Law 95-105 (August 
1977), which requires the United States to place important emphasis on the development and use of light capital 
technologies in her participation in the 1979 U.N. Conference on Science and Technology for Development. 
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(developing countries with rich nautral resources) and the Fourth World (developing 
countries with little marketable resources). Some developing countries are rich in hard 
currency but deficient in technical skills, whereas others may have thousands of scientists 
but are overburdened with large poor populations. Some developing countries have had a 
great deal of experience in successfully dealing with transnational enterprises, whereas 
others may have stuck to stringent self-reliance as the basic development strategy. Given 
such heterogeneity, it is impossible and unwise to conlude that small-scale, labor- 
intensive, and decentralized technologies are always most appropriate to developing coun- 
tries, although such technological options should be considered. In fact, certain develop- 
ing countries may have a latecomer’s advantage as compared to the industrialized coun- 
tries in adopting the most advanced technologies. A case in point is the use of fiber optics 
in telecommunications, which may be very appropriate for developing countries that do 
not have to be concerned by the cost of writing off the capital of large copperwire 
telephone systems since they do not exist. Other examples include the use of plastics for 
automobiles and airplanes, the use of the most advanced steelmaking processes, and the 
use of satellites for communication, education, and surveying for vast areas without an 
industrial infrastructure. 
The preceding discussion suggests that the major thrust of TA for developing coun- 
tries would be the selection of appropriate technology (AT) on the basis of national 
development goals and sectoral/local community needs. Although TA has not yet been 
widely practiced or even understood by most developing countries, the early discussions 
certainly have pointed in the direction of linking TA with AT [56, 571. Conceptually, this 
linkage may be represented by Fig. 5, which may be compared with TA for industrial 
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Fig. 5. Technology assessment for developing countries. 
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Technological choices by developing countries are usually perceived to be of two 
basic types: (1) imported technology and (2) technology A or technology B [58]. This is 
frequently the case at present, and the technological options for developing countries are 
therefore rather limited. Two ways of broadening the options are suggested by Fig. 5. 
First, combinations of imported technologies and indigenous technologies should be con- 
sidered. However, any intricate combination would require an in-depth knowledge of the 
imported technologies, a knowledge that may not be accessible to many developing 
countries. The second way is to develop the skill and institutional arrangements so that the 
transnational enterprises would be motivated to create and modify the technologies they 
intend to import, and the national organizations would be capable of creating and modify- 
ing the indigenous technologies, all based on the national development goals and sectoral/ 
local community needs of the developing country in question. This second approach is 
more difficult because developing countries, and even the smaller industrialized countries, 
are generally consumers or receivers, rather than generators, of technology [59]. More- 
over, some developing countries may be too weak and too soft to deal effectively with 
large transnational enterprises whose sales volume may be comparable or much larger 
than the developing country’s GNP [60]. 
Although the suggested ways of broadening the technological options for developing 
countries are very ambitious undertakings, some specific measures have been proposed to 
improve the access of developing countries to technological know-how, to increase the 
applied research capacity of the developing countries, and to encourage the industrial 
countries to develop appropriate technologies tailored to the needs of developing countries 
[61]. The institutional capability and arrangements will take time to build. Meanwhile, the 
developing countries need to develop their own capabilities and institutions for TA so that 
TA by them as well as for them will become possible. Until developing countries are 
themselves involved in technology assessment, creation, and selection, they will not gain 
the technological independence they desire. 
Transnationally, the United Nations have been an active catalyst in introducing TA to 
the developing countries [56, 571. Significant international efforts have been made to 
assess the environmental impact of certain technological projects [48, 621. Some bilateral 
discussions and exchanges of information about TA have taken place between individual 
developing countries and industrialized countries. However, to our knowledge, there has 
been no full-fledged TA projects involving a group of developing countries, analogous to 
the OECD and CMEA projects discussed previously. 
The United Nations Conference on Science and Technology for Development 
(UNCSTD), scheduled for 1979, is supposed to help build programs supportive of the 
self-reliant and equitable principles of the New International Economic Order [63]. It 
remains to be seen to what extent TA by the developing countries will be facilitated by the 
UNCSTD and its follow-up activities, and to what extent TA by the developing countries 
will help shape and bring about the New International Scientific and Technological Order. 
Toward Global Technology Assessment 
With its increasing power, scale, and complexity, technology and its impacts respect 
no national boundary. Assessment of certian powerful, large-scale, and pervasive 
technologies must be conducted on a global basis involving all country groups. The 
assessments of nuclear power, earth-orbiting satellites, and energy technologies having 
global environmental impacts are just a few examples. 





































Fig. 6. Elements of similarities and differences in TA premises and processes among the three groups of 
countries (I-industrialized market economies; II-centrally planned economies; III-developing coan- 
triesl. 
It has been argued previously [64] that a cross-national understanding of technology 
policy decision processes and basic premises underlying TA must be established before 
effective international TA can be accomplished. Therefore, before any global TA is 
attempted, it behooves us to compare the differences and similarities in TA premises and 
processes of the various countries in the world. 
In the previous sections we have discussed the differences in TA as perceived and 
practiced by the three country groups of industrialized market economies, centrally 
planned economies, and developing countries. These differences are further expanded and 
summarized in Fig. 6. From the standpoint of basic social values, we see tbe difference in 
major emphases being placed on diversity [6516, efficiency, and equity, respectively. 
Interestingly, this difference in values seems to reflect more the different social needs at 
various technoeconomic development stages rather than different ideologies. In terms of 
TA, we see the difference in major thrusts being directed to the anticipation and control of 
negative side effects of technology, to the social management of technology as part of 
central planning, and to the development and selection of appropriate technologies. 
Under the “process” column in Fig. 6, differences among the three country groups 
lie first in their concerns about their respective traditional processes through which 
technologies are developed, adopted, and diffused. Thus the industrialized market 
economies are concerned about controlling the private sector without stifling its creativity 
6 The term “diversity” here refers to the coexistence and simultaneous expression of disparate rankings of 
social values by a variety of social groups. 
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and initiatives in technological change. The centrally planned economies are concerned 
about efficiency in their public sector, which has traditionally planned and managed their 
technological change, whereas the developing countries are concerned about excessive 
influence of the transnational enterprises instrumental in bringing modem technology to 
the developing countries. The three groups of countries also differ greatly in their pro- 
cesses through which conflicts about technological issues are resolved. While the industri- 
alized market economies are accustomed to the open adversarial process in public debate, 
the centrally planned economies generally resort to social consultation within the planning 
process. A mixture of these two kinds of conflict resolution processes is usually found in 
most developing countries. However, the more important factor in the developing coun- 
tries is their aspiration for true self-determination in science and technology, which can be 
achieved only by gaining access to technological information that they do not now have. 
In spite of such profound differences, there are basic similarities among all country 
groups. As shown in Fig. 6, a central element of similarity in TA premises among all 
country groups is that technologies that have broad social implications should be brought 
under social control. Thus, as has been discussed previously, all three groups have a 
reduced laissez faire attitude toward science and technology, and social management of 
technology is becoming an increasingly accepted concept, even in the industrialized 
market economies [66]. 
There are also basic similarities among all three groups in their policy making 
processes within which TA must operate. For example, large-scale technological 
developments-space exploration, nuclear power, and so on-are largely under the con- 
trol and regulation of national government agencies. The two-communities theory-that 
TA doers and users live and operate in separate worlds with different and often conflicting 
values, different reward systems, and different languages-probably bave equal validity 
in explaining and predicting the difficulty in effective use of TA in real policymaking in 
all countries. Finally, the absence of a powerful international governing body having the 
authority to legislate and enforce international laws makes global and international TA 
equally difficult in this respect for all countries. 
Although we should emphasize the similarities in the development of effective global 
technology assessment methodologies, we maintain that we should also be aware of and 
sensitive to the differences in order to avoid unnecessary snarls. Moreover, the differences 
could also provide an opportunity for mutual learning. For example, the experience of 
industrialized market economies in dealing with diverse goals and values in technology 
assessment would be helpful when there are conflicting goals and values between coun- 
tries participating in global technology assessments. On the other hand, the experience of 
centrally planned economies and developing countries in linking TA to social goals can be 
exploited once sufficient agreement on some specific goals and criteria for a global 
technology assessment is reached. 
In conclusion, we believe that global TA is needed for the future of mankind on 
spaceship earth. Global TA is difficult, but not impossible. The experiences of transna- 
tional TA within the OECD and CMEA are useful initial steps. To work across country 
groups, we believe that an in-depth crossnational understanding of TA premises and 
processes is a prerequisite for global TA. Appropriate and effective common 
methodologies can then be developed for global TAs involving more than one group of 
countries, without a complete agreement on premises and processes. Eventually new and 
effective methodologies and institutions for global technology assessments can emerge 
after sufficient learning from the actual experience through international collaborative 
efforts across groups of countries. 
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